You ≠ me: individual differences in the structure of social cognition by Shaw, D. J. et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Psychological Research 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-018-1107-3
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
You ≠ me: individual differences in the structure of social cognition
D. J. Shaw1,2 · K. Czekóová1,3 · C. R. Pennington4 · A. W. Qureshi5 · B. Špiláková1 · M. Salazar1 · M. Brázdil1 · T. Urbánek3
Received: 17 April 2018 / Accepted: 4 October 2018 
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
This study investigated the structure of social cognition, and how it is influenced by personality; specifically, how various 
socio-cognitive capabilities, and the pattern of inter-relationships and co-dependencies among them differ between diver-
gent personality styles. To measure social cognition, a large non-clinical sample (n = 290) undertook an extensive battery 
of self-report and performance-based measures of visual perspective taking, imitative tendencies, affective empathy, intero-
ceptive accuracy, emotion regulation, and state affectivity. These same individuals then completed the Personality Styles 
and Disorders Inventory. Latent Profile Analysis revealed two dissociable personality profiles that exhibited contrasting 
cognitive and affective dispositions, and multivariate analyses indicated further that these profiles differed on measures of 
social cognition; individuals characterised by a flexible and adaptive personality profile expressed higher action orientation 
(emotion regulation) compared to those showing more inflexible tendencies, along with better visual perspective taking, 
superior interoceptive accuracy, less imitative tendencies, and lower personal distress and negativity. These characteristics 
point towards more efficient self-other distinction, and to higher cognitive control more generally. Moreover, low-level 
cognitive mechanisms served to mediate other higher level socio-emotional capabilities. Together, these findings elucidate 
the cognitive and affective underpinnings of individual differences in social behaviour, providing a data-driven model that 
should guide future research in this area.
Introduction
We take for granted the sophisticated repertoire of skills 
required to navigate our way through the myriad of social 
contexts encountered on a daily basis. Even in simple face-
to-face interactions, for example, achieving a desired out-
come requires us to infer the mental and emotional states of 
our interaction partner(s) whilst adapting our own behav-
iour accordingly. This broad set of cognitive mechanisms is 
referred to collectively as social cognition, and an extensive 
literature has revealed its highly nuanced and multifaceted 
composition (see Frith & Frith, 2012; Happé, Cook, & Bird, 
2017). Despite this developing understanding, however, an 
overarching model of social cognition has not yet been spec-
ified; it remains unknown if and how its various sub-com-
ponents are inter-related or co-dependent on one another, or 
how individual differences in this structure impact on social 
behaviour.
Research has delineated a variety of socio-cognitive 
and -emotional mechanisms that enable individuals to 
interact within social situations (see Frith & Frith, 2012). 
The conventional perspective on social cognition places 
each facet within a hierarchical network, in which lower 
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level mechanisms contribute partly towards, or serve as 
necessary prerequisites for higher level processes (Happé 
et al., 2017). One such elementary mechanism is self-other 
distinction (SOD), through which we are able to treat inde-
pendently and distinguish flexibly between representations 
of the self and others (Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016; 
Steinbeis, 2016). Inefficient SOD results in ego-centric 
misattributions of our own cognitive and affective states 
onto others, leading us to respond inappropriately in social 
interactions. This is true, especially when inferring our 
interaction partners’ perspective or understanding of a sit-
uation; since the perspective of others often conflicts with 
our own, appreciating another’s point of view requires us 
to detach ourselves from our own viewpoint (Epley, Key-
sar, van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004). Experimental tasks 
designed to measure perspective-taking attempt to tap into 
this capacity to resolve self-other conflict, and demonstrate 
the cognitive cost involved in SOD (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & 
Brauner, 2000; Samson et al., 2010). Recently, however, 
conflict resolution has been shown to be just one of two 
dimensions along which perspective-taking ability var-
ies; compared with individuals reporting an ego-centric 
attentional focus during social interactions, those reporting 
more altercentrism or a greater flexibility in attentional 
focus between self and other exhibit a better perspective-
taking performance (Bukowski & Samson, 2016). In this 
light, variations in attentional focus might underlie the 
reports of individual differences in perspective taking 
(e.g., Peterson, Bellows, & Peterson, 2015).
Self-other distinction is also believed to serve a funda-
mental role in imitation. Humans exhibit an involuntary 
tendency to mimic one another during social interaction, 
which serves important social functions—it enhances rap-
port and affiliation among interactants (Chartrand & Lakin, 
2013; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Hayes, 2010). Neurosci-
entific investigations have revealed this involuntary behav-
iour results from a common neural coding (“mirroring”) of 
self- and other-action (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Iaco-
boni et al., 2009). Since our own and others’ actions share 
a common representational space in the brain, controlling 
imitative tendencies requires SOD to differentiate between 
them (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Guzman et al., 2016; 
Steinbeis, 2016). Consistent with the notion of SOD pro-
viding a low-level mechanism common to both perspective 
taking and imitation, several studies have demonstrated that 
the expression of involuntary imitation is related inversely to 
perspective-taking performance (Santiesteban et al., 2012a; 
b; Shaw, Czekóová, & Porubanová, 2017; Spengler, Bird, & 
Brass, 2010). Interestingly, attentional focus also appears to 
exert an influence on imitative tendencies, since individuals 
scoring high on narcissism show lower involuntary imita-
tion (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2013; Obhi, Hogeveen, Giacomin, 
& Jordan, 2014).
Neural mirroring mechanisms give rise to brain coupling 
between actor and observer, thereby affording inter-subjec-
tivity. As such, similar mechanisms might contribute towards 
empathy—that is, an affective state elicited by observing or 
imagining another person experiencing an emotion, which is 
both isomorphic to the other’s state yet accompanied by the 
knowledge that the other person is the source of one’s own 
affective response (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). Through 
neural mirroring, observing another’s emotions might acti-
vate our own affective brain systems, thereby allowing us to 
share in their affective state (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Key-
sers, 2009; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011). Recent models 
distinguish between an affective and cognitive component of 
empathy (e.g., Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, Aha-
ron-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). Given conflicting taxonomies 
surrounding this dichotomy, we take the former to capture 
the process of affective sharing (or emotional contagion), 
and the latter analogous to emotion recognition—a propo-
sitional knowledge of the other’s emotional state (see Coll 
et al., 2017). Since empathic expression is considered a pri-
mary trait that drives individual differences in social behav-
iour (Baron-Cohen, 2009), it is important to elucidate its 
interdependences on other socio-cognitive and/or -emotional 
mechanisms that might exert a mediating influence (Kan-
ske, Boeckler, & Singer, 2015). For example, SOD should 
be necessary to disambiguate between self- and other-affect 
representations during affective empathy/sharing; inad-
equate SOD might lead to self-other merging, resulting in 
personal distress when sharing in others’ negative affective 
states (Lamm et al., 2016).
Accurate processing and interpretation of affective states 
elicited during empathy also requires a mechanism of intero-
ception, the sensory system through which afferent physi-
ological signals of bodily states are communicated (Tsakiris 
& Critchley, 2016). Our sensitivity to internal physiological 
signals influences our subjective experience of emotions and 
the processing of affective states observed in others (Critch-
ley & Garfinkel, 2017; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, & Dolan, 
2004). Indeed, some studies indicate that greater interocep-
tive accuracy is related to heightened empathic expression 
(Critchley & Harrison, 2013; Grynberg & Pollatos, 2015). 
Other studies have found no such relationship, however, sug-
gesting that any link between interoception and empathy is 
complex, possibly involving other mediating mechanisms 
(e.g., Ainley, Maister, & Tsakiris, 2015). Those exhibiting 
high interoceptive accuracy also demonstrate a proficiency 
in regulating their emotions (Füstös, Gramann, Herbert, & 
Pollatus, 2012). Conversely, interoceptive hypervigilance 
is associated with the symptoms of anxiety and depression 
(Dunn et al., 2010; for a review see Domschke, Stevens, 
Pfleiderer, & Gerlach, 2010). The direction of this associa-
tion appears to be mediated by self-referential processing 
(e.g., self-image; for a review, see Paulus & Stein, 2010). 
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Given its potential influence on other components of social 
cognition, elucidating individual differences in interoception 
and its relationship with other aspects of social cognition is 
central to our understanding of social behaviour (Garfinkel 
et al., 2015).
Emotional reactions comprise a set of physiological 
changes that influence our behavioural response to environ-
mental demands; when scared, we might recoil automati-
cally, but, when angered, we might engage aggressively 
with the provocateur. Although such automatic behavioural 
reactions can serve important adaptive functions (i.e., fight-
or-flight responses), emotion-driven behaviours are often ill-
suited to social contexts and must be down-regulated (Gross, 
2002). Suppressing impulsive emotion-driven behavioural 
responses requires cognitive control in the context of emo-
tionally evocative stimuli (Tottenham et al., 2011). Emotion 
regulation, then, is another core component of social behav-
iour (Schipper & Peterman, 2013). Indeed, emotional dys-
regulation is observed in clinical syndromes characterised 
largely by atypical social behaviour, such as autism (Kon-
stantareas & Stewart, 2006), conduct disorder (Davidson, 
Putnam, & Lawson, 2000), and borderline personality disor-
der (Fertuck, Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Hoermann, & Stanley, 
2006). A number of potential mechanisms appear to underlie 
this; for example, research demonstrates that the ability to 
self-regulate emotional states is associated inversely with 
an individual’s general negative affectivity (Eisenberg et al., 
1994; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000).
Given the combined influence of attentional focus (alter- 
versus ego-centrism), interoceptive sensitivity and state 
affectivity, and the capacity for emotional self-regulation, it 
follows that any discussion of individual differences in social 
cognition demands a consideration of personality. Very few 
studies have explored the links between social cognition and 
personality in the healthy population, however, and those 
that have report inconsistent findings; while reduced imita-
tive tendencies are reported in narcissism (Hogeveen & Obhi 
2013; Obhi et al., 2014), and the self-reported cognitive and 
affective empathy have been associated with agreeableness 
and conscientiousness (Melchers et al., 2016), the other 
studies have found no such relationships (Butler, Ward, & 
Ramsay, 2015). This contrasts with the findings of investiga-
tions into atypical social cognition in clinical samples; social 
cognitive dysfunction is observed in a number of personality 
disorders (Herpertz & Bertsch, 2014), and disorder severity 
is often related to empathic expression (Hengartner et al., 
2014). Individuals with narcissistic personality disorder, 
for instance, exhibit deficits in affective but not cognitive 
empathy (Herpertz & Bertsch, 2014). Furthermore, patients 
with borderline personality disorder display impaired emo-
tion regulation and high personal distress when empathising 
(New et al., 2012), together with poor perspective taking 
(Semerari et al., 2014; 2015). This may be a consequence 
of their ego-centric attentional focus (Frick, Lang, & 
Kotchoubey, 2012). Antisocial personality disorder is also 
characterised by ego-centrism, coupled with emotional 
detachment (for a comprehensive review, see Thoma et al., 
2013). For this reason, Moroni et al. (2016) have proposed 
that personality style, rather than diagnostic category, gives 
rise to these atypical patterns of social cognition.
The sparse research that has investigated relationships 
between personality and social cognition in the healthy 
population has employed a variable-centred approach; 
studies have focused on the degree of relatedness between 
pre-defined stable personality traits (e.g., neuroticism) and 
behavioural measures across entire samples (e.g., Butler 
et al., 2015). The findings from such investigations pro-
vide no information on the organisation or dynamics of the 
mechanisms underlying an individual’s personality, however 
(Block, 2010; Kuhl, Kazén, & Koole, 2006). An alternative 
functional approach is offered by Personality System Inter-
action theory (PSI; Kuhl, 2000a, b), which considers person-
ality to emerge through dynamic interplays between affective 
dispositions (e.g., sensitivity to negative affect) and the pref-
erence for certain modes of cognitive processing (e.g., ana-
lytical versus intuitive). In short, there are four sub-systems 
that interact to structure personality: intention memory (rea-
son), extension memory (self), intuitive behavioural control 
(habits), and an object recognition system (mistake focus). 
Interactions between these systems, regulated by positive 
and negative affectivity, determine an individual’s personal-
ity style and, in turn, their behavioural pattern in social con-
texts. As such, personalities will differ substantially between 
people who are able to regulate their affective state flexibly 
according to task demands (action orientation) and those 
who ruminate in their emotions (state orientation). The PSI 
framework is conceptualised dimensionally; each dimen-
sion is measured on a continuum ranging from personality 
style to disorder (e.g., charming to histrionic), with disorders 
proposed to emerge as a result of inflexible (persistent) and 
maladaptive preferences for a certain style across differ-
ent situations. This theory may, therefore, be advantageous 
when investigating individual differences in social cogni-
tion. Importantly, PSI theory is informed by neurobiological 
data (Baumann, Kuhl, & Kazén, 2005; see Kuhl & Quirin, 
2011) and supported by behavioural evidence (Jostmann, & 
Koole, 2007; Kazén, Kuhl, & Quirin, 2015; Koole & Fock-
enberg, 2011; Quirin, Bode, & Kuhl, 2011). Furthermore, 
since the functional basis of relationships between affective 
and cognitive systems is the same for personality styles and 
disorders, PSI theory permits parallels to be drawn between 
healthy and clinical populations; it allows us to build upon 
the recent findings of specific impairments to social cogni-
tion in different personality disorders (Moroni et al., 2016; 
Semerari et al., 2014, 2015) by identifying subgroups of 
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non-clinical individuals with similar profiles of personality 
style.
To advance our understanding of individual differences in 
the structure of social cognition, this investigation employed 
an analytical technique capable of capturing sample hetero-
geneity by classifying individuals into dissociable subgroups 
of personality styles defined by PSI. Differences among 
personality profiles were then explored with a large battery 
of self-report and performance-based measures employed 
frequently to assess discrete components of social cogni-
tion; namely, perspective taking, imitative tendencies, affec-
tive empathy, interoception, and emotion regulation. This 
allowed us to gain insight into the tapestry of inter-relation-
ships and co-dependencies among these core components of 
social cognition in the typical population, and the potentially 
differentiating influence of personality.
Methods
Participants
Three hundred and seven right-handed individuals (122 
males) from Brno, Czech Republic, participated in this 
study, but data from four of these individuals were omitted, 
because they represented multivariate outliers. Data from the 
remaining 303 individuals (122 males; Mage = 23.1 years, 
SE = 0.18) were used for personality assessment, with all 
individuals reporting normal or correct-to-normal eyesight 
and no neurological or psychiatric diagnoses. After exclud-
ing from this initial personality sample any individuals from 
whom we had incomplete data across all measures of social 
cognition (n = 13; see “Statistical Analyses”), further analy-
ses were conducted on a sub-set of 290 individuals (117 
males; Mage = 23.03 years, SE = 0.19). Sensitivity power 
analyses indicated that this sample size was sufficient to 
detect the smallest effect size of interest (r > .10) with 80% 
power, consistent with guidelines on individual differences 
(Gignac & Szodari, 2016). Comprehensive participant 
demographics are provided in Supplementary Table S1 (see 
Supplementary Material). The study was approved by the 
Ethics Board of the Institute of Psychology, Academy of 
Sciences in the Czech Republic. All individuals provided 
informed consent prior to their participation in the study, and 
were recompensed with 200 Kč (approx. €7.5).
Measures and procedure
Participants completed a personality assessment prior to 
their arrival in the laboratory. Individual facets of social cog-
nition were then measured using a variety of computerised 
measures administered in Cogent (v1.31; http://www.visla 
b.ucl.ac.uk/cogen t), a toolbox for MATLAB (vR2015b; The 
MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA).
Personality
Personality was assessed with the Personality Styles and 
Disorders Inventory (PSDI; Kuhl & Kazén, 2002), a self-
report instrument borne out of PSI theory. The PSDI com-
prises 140 items, each rated on a four-point Likert scale (0 = 
“Certainly no”, 3 = “Certainly yes”). Together, these items 
measure 14 personality dimensions, which are presented in 
Supplementary Table S2 along with reliability measures (all 
a > 0.64). Importantly, personality styles identified with this 
instrument differentiate on a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., 
Urbánek, & Marček, 2016).
Imitative tendencies
Imitation was assessed with a stimulus–response compat-
ibility task (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001), whereby 
participants are required to execute finger-lifting actions 
in response to a coloured dot (imperative stimulus) while 
observing task-irrelevant finger actions performed by a 
model’s hand (stimulus hand). The degree to which par-
ticipants are faster and more accurate at executing finger 
movements signalled by the imperative stimulus when they 
observe simultaneous compatible (matching) compared with 
incompatible (opposing) movements is referred to as auto-
matic imitation, and is considered an experimental measure 
of spontaneous mimicry. Genschow et al. (2017) reported a 
high split-half reliability of 0.86 for this compatibility effect.
To avoid the confounding influences of anatomical, 
spatial- and orthogonal-compatibility effects (Shaw et al., 
2017), the observed finger actions were performed by a 
left or right stimulus hand rotated, respectively, clockwise 
(+ 90°) or counter-clockwise (− 90°) from the participants’ 
perspective (see Supplementary Figure S1). Each trial began 
with the stimulus hand resting on a flat surface, signalling 
that participants should depress both the left and right direc-
tional arrows on a standard keyboard with the index and 
middle finger of their right hand, respectively. After 800, 
1600, or 2400 ms, selected randomly, the warning stimulus 
was replaced with an end-point image of the same stimulus 
hand performing either an index or middle finger extension. 
In this end-point image, a dot was presented between the 
index and middle finger, the colour of which served as the 
imperative stimulus—it signalled whether the participant 
should extend their own index or middle finger (the colour-
finger pairing was counterbalanced across participants). In 
response to the imperative stimulus, participants lifted the 
corresponding finger as quickly as possible, thereby releas-
ing a key. The trial then ended with a blank screen pre-
sented for 1000 ms. The combination of imperative stimulus 
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and stimulus hand resulted in four trial types: compatible 
(the same finger action was both signalled and observed), 
incompatible (opposite finger actions were signalled and 
observed), baseline (a movement was signalled, but the 
stimulus hand did not move a finger), and catch (no move-
ment was signalled, but the stimulus hand moved a finger). 
The procedure comprised two blocks of 90 trials—30 com-
patible, 30 incompatible, 20 baseline, and 10 catch—with 
accuracy and response time (RT) measured on each trial. 
Each block presented either the + 90° or − 90° rotation of 
the stimulus hand, with the order of blocks counterbalanced 
across participants. Five practice trials were completed 
before the task began. To be consistent with the vast major-
ity of stimulus–response paradigms employed to investigate 
automatic imitation and its relationship with other socio-
cognitive variables (Cracco et al., 2018), we subtracted mean 
RT on the incompatible from the compatible condition. We 
refer to this herein as automatic imitation, with higher scores 
representing greater imitative tendencies.
Visual perspective taking
The director task (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000) was employed 
to measure low-level (level-one) visual perspective-taking 
(VPT). This task requires participants to move objects 
around a grid of shelves according to verbal instructions 
given by a ‘Director’. Sometimes, the grid display affords 
two competing perspectives; the participants’ viewpoint 
from the front of the display differs from the Director’s 
vantage point from the rear. Under these conditions, the 
participants must ignore their own self-perspective and act 
according to their inference of the Director’s perspective.
An example trial from each of the three conditions is 
illustrated in Supplementary Figure S1. On each trial, the 
stimulus consisted of an 8 × 8 grid of shelves forming 16 
boxes, five of which had opaque backs. Various objects 
were placed within eight of these boxes, and the participant 
was presented with a recorded verbal instruction from the 
Director to move one of the objects to a different box. The 
Director was located behind the shelf display in all the con-
ditions, which meant that she was unable to see the contents 
of the five opaque boxes—their contents were visible only 
from the participant’s (front) perspective. On experimental 
trials, the Director’s instruction referred to an object in one 
of the opaque boxes; in the illustrated example, the Director 
would instruct the participant to “move the smallest apple”. 
This created a discrepancy between the Director and partici-
pants’ perspectives, and to follow the instructions correctly 
on these trials, the participant had to discount any “distrac-
tor” objects not visible to the Director (e.g., they were to 
move the medium-sized apple rather than the smallest). In 
the first- and second-control conditions, there was no dis-
tractor object to discount; it was replaced in the first, and in 
the second, the Director’s instruction referred to an object 
in a box that they could see. Each condition comprised 20 
trials presented pseudo-randomly. The recordings of verbal 
instructions were equivalent across all 60 trials [mean dura-
tion = 3.26 (SD = 0.22) s]. Participants responded by indi-
cating with the mouse into which box the object should be 
moved, and accuracy and RT were measured on each trial.
In line with our previous research (Shaw et al., 2017), in 
which we revealed a relationship between VPT and auto-
matic imitation using the exact same experimental proce-
dures, we used a residualised measure of difference between 
the conditions: First, at the participant level, to account for 
any speed-accuracy trade-off, we calculated inverted effi-
ciency scores in each condition by dividing the mean RT by 
the proportion of correct responses. This was justified, since 
RT and accuracy were correlated in all conditions (r > 0.12, 
p < 0.043; see Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). We then averaged 
inverted efficiency scores over the two control conditions. 
Finally, across the entire sample, we regressed these aver-
aged scores across the control conditions from those in the 
experimental condition. This produced standardised residu-
als for each participant, with higher values representing 
poorer performance on trials, whereby their own perspec-
tive differed from the director’s relative to those in which no 
such discrepancy existed. To our knowledge, there has been 
no formal assessment of reliability for the director task, so 
we assessed the split-half reliability of our data from this 
performance measure. Both RTs and accuracy demonstrated 
excellent split-half reliability in each condition (> 0.96).
Interoception
We assessed interoception implicitly by measuring heart-
beat estimation with the mental tracking method (Schan-
dry, 1981)—a well-validated technique with the reports of 
test–retest reliability up to 0.81 (Knoll & Hodapp, 1992; 
Werner et al., 2013). This task measures the accuracy with 
which individuals count their own heartbeat, a measure that 
correlates highly with awareness of other bodily cues (e.g., 
gastric events; Herbert et al., 2012).
To ensure accurate measurements of heart rate, par-
ticipants were instructed not to drink caffeinated drinks or 
smoke cigarettes 1 h prior to the experimental procedure. 
Prior to the task, participants were instructed to rest for 
5 min, allowing their heart rate to return to resting levels. 
Participants then completed a heartbeat estimation task, 
which comprised a four block sequence of different time 
intervals (25, 35, 45, and 55 s) presented in a pseudo-random 
fashion, with inter-block intervals ranging between 10 and 
30 s. Throughout all the blocks, participants wore noise-can-
celling headphones through which white noise was played 
and were asked to close their eyes. Participants received the 
following the standardised instruction: ‘Without checking, 
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can you count silently each heartbeat you feel in your 
body from the first to the second tone. Any kind of physical 
manipulation, such as holding your breath or evaluating 
your pulse, is not allowed’. After each block, the participant 
was asked to state verbally the number of heartbeats that 
they had counted in that interval.
Actual heartbeat was measured during each interval via 
the electrocardiogram (ECG), recorded with a PsychLab 
EEG8 amplifier unit (http://www.psych lab.com/EEG_8_
ampli fier.html) sampling at 1000 Hz and Ag-AgCl surface 
electrodes positioned on the participant’s left and right wrist. 
The ECG data acquired during the task were analysed offline 
using a processing pipeline in MATLAB (http://www.libro 
w.com/cases /case-2), which involves a Fourier transforma-
tion to remove low-frequency drifts from the recording and 
the subsequent identification of local maxima considered 
to be R-peaks. Our measure of interoceptive accuracy was 
calculated according to the formula given by Garfinkel et al. 
(2015):
Emotion regulation
Implicit measure
Emotion regulation was measured implicitly with an emo-
tional Go/No-Go task, which assesses individuals’ ability 
to maintain cognitive control over impulsive responses to 
emotionally evocative stimuli (e.g., Tottenham et al., 2011). 
The previous research using the Go/No-Go task reports good 
test–retest reliability (0.65; Weafer, Baggott, & de Wit, 
2013).
This task comprised six blocks of 40 trials. In each block, 
a sequence of face stimuli was presented in rapid succession, 
each face showing one of two expressions. At the beginning 
of each block, participants were instructed to press the space 
bar as quickly as possible whenever a particular expression 
was presented. These “Go” trials occurred frequently (70%; 
28) in a given block to instil a pre-potent tendency for the 
participant to respond. The remaining “No-Go” trials (30%; 
12) presented participants with a different emotional expres-
sion. Participants were instructed to withhold the response 
for any facial expression other than the “Go” expression. 
The task comprised three emotional (angry, fearful, and 
happy expressions) and three non-emotional blocks (neu-
tral expressions). In any given block, an emotional expres-
sion was always paired with a neutral expression; the emo-
tional expression served as either the “Go” stimulus (with 
the neutral expression as the “No-Go” stimulus) or the 
“No-Go” stimulus (with the neutral expression serving as 
the “Go” stimulus). The blocks comprising these pairings 
were performed in counterbalanced order: Angry–neutral 
and neutral–angry; fearful–neutral and neutral–fearful; 
1 −
(|nbeatsreal − nbeatsreported|
)
∕
((
nbeatsreal + nbeatsreported
)
∕2
)
.
happy–neutral and neutral–happy. Each trial started with a 
fixation cross presented for 1000–2000 ms (M = 1500), fol-
lowed by the face stimulus presented for 500 ms (see Sup-
plementary Figure S1). The order of Go and No-Go trials 
was pseudo-randomised to ensure that no two No-Go trials 
occurred in succession. Prior to the task, participants per-
formed a short practice block with a different stimulus set 
to that used in the experimental blocks. The face stimuli 
were selected from the Radboud Faces Database (14 males; 
Langner et al., 2010); each one grey scaled and cropped to 
remove any hair.
As a measure of emotion regulation, we extracted the 
proportion of trials in which the participant incorrectly 
responded to an emotional No-Go stimulus; that is, the false-
alarm rate on emotional blocks (Tottenham et al., 2011). Fol-
lowing the approach taken by Tottenham et al. (2011), these 
values were z-scored by normalising to the sample standard 
deviation. Importantly, higher values on this measure repre-
sent poorer emotion regulation ability.
Explicit measure
To assess emotion regulation via self-report, participants 
completed the Action Control Scale (Kuhl, 1994), an instru-
ment that measures an individual’s ability to regulate affec-
tive states quickly and flexibly in response to environmental 
demands (action orientation) rather than fixating on them 
in a change-preventing volitional mode that allows them to 
impact upon behaviour (state orientation).
This 36-item questionnaire consists of three sub-scales, 
each measured by 12 items: action orientation after failure 
versus preoccupation (AOF); demand-related action ori-
entation versus hesitation (AOD); and action orientation 
during activity performance versus volatility (AOP). Each 
item presents an everyday situation (e.g., “When I am told 
that my work has been completely unsatisfactory”), and par-
ticipants select one of two possibilities—one indicative of 
action orientation (“I don’t let it bother me for too long”) 
and the other of state orientation (“I feel paralyzed”). Since 
AOP is considered less relevant than AOF and AOD to the 
personality theory (see below; Kuhl, 1994), we focus only 
on the latter two dimensions herein. These two sub-scales 
achieved acceptable reliability (a > 0.74; see Supplementary 
Table S2).
Empathy
Implicit measure
To measure empathy implicitly, we developed a task that 
followed the same principles as the Multifaceted Empathy 
Test (Dziobek et al., 2008); a performance measure proven 
effective in dissociating between the cognitive and affective 
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components of empathy at the behavioural and neurophysi-
ological level, and in healthy and clinical samples (Mazza 
et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2015).
In our adaptation (see Czekóová et al., 2016), participants 
were presented with 30 colour photographs of individuals 
experiencing different emotions in various contexts. The 
task involves two blocks, with each photograph presented 
randomly in each block. In the first block, participants were 
required to select one of four options that best describes how 
they believe the person in the image is feeling (cognitive 
empathy). In the second block, they rated their own arousal 
in response to observing the emotion expressed by the per-
son in the image (affective empathy) on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = “None”, 7 = “Very strong”; affective empathy). 
Both accuracy and arousal ratings were recorded. In both 
blocks, each image was presented for a maximum of 10 s. 
Internal consistency was excellent for measures of affective 
empathy (Cronbach’s α = 0.84). Unlike our initial piloting, 
however, in which we achieved good levels of reliability 
for the measure of cognitive empathy (n = 112, α = 0.67), 
this measure achieved unacceptable reliability in the pre-
sent sample (α = 0.47). For this reason, we focus only on 
the former measurement herein, referred to henceforth as 
affective empathy.
Explicit measure
We also obtained an explicit, self-report measure of empa-
thy with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), a 
multidimensional measure of individual differences in trait 
empathy shown to be valid and highly reliable across a range 
of populations pertinent to the present sample (mid- to late-
adolescence [Hawk et al., 2013], various European countries 
[De Corte et al., 2007; Gilet et al., 2013], and experimental 
hypotheses [autistic individuals; Rogers et al., 2007]).
This 28-item instrument consists of four seven-item 
sub-scales that measure discrete empathic tendencies: Per-
spective taking (adopting spontaneously the psychological 
perspective of others), Fantasy (transposing oneself imagi-
natively into the feelings and actions of fictitious charac-
ters), Empathic concern (adopting “other-oriented” feelings 
of sympathy and concern), and Personal distress (having 
“self-oriented” feelings of personal anxiety and unease 
in tense interpersonal settings). The Perspective taking 
and Fantasy sub-scales’ index cognitive empathy, whilst 
Empathic concern and Personal distress reflect affective 
empathy. Participants indicated their answer for each item on 
a five-point Likert scale (1 = “Does not describe me well”, 
5 = “Describes me very well”). Given that we were inter-
ested primarily in empathy as it unfolds during real-world 
social interactions, we focused only on perspective taking, 
empathic concern, and personal distress (for related discus-
sions see De Corte et al., 2007; Su, Lee, Ding, & Comer, 
2005) [see Supplementary Table S2 for the internal consist-
ency of all three sub-scales (α > 0.73)].
State affectivity
To measure participants’ state affectivity at the time of test-
ing, we employed the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect 
Test (Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009)—a task designed to 
measure implicitly an individual’s positive and negative 
affective state. This measure has been shown to have good 
test–retest reliability (> 0.72) and construct validity (Quirin 
et al., 2009; van der Ploeg et al., 2016), and to predict physi-
ological indices of affectivity (e.g., cortisol levels) much 
better than direct self-report instruments (Quirin & Bode, 
2014).
The test consisted of six artificial words (e.g., “SAFME” 
and “TALEP”) that participants were asked to rate in terms 
of the extent to which they conveyed six different mood 
states (happy, cheerful, energetic, helpless, tense, or inhib-
ited), using a four-point Likert scale (1 = “Does not fit 
at all”, 4 = “Fits very well”). In a pseudo-random order, 
each non-word was presented six times alongside one of 
the six mood-state adjectives, resulting in 36 trials. Ratings 
across both positive and negative adjectives showed accept-
able internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.71 and 0.66, 
respectively), and positive and negative affectivity scores 
were uncorrelated (r(288) = 0.08). Given its known relation-
ship with the other measures of social cognition (Eisenberg 
et al., 1994; Okun et al., 2000), we focused our analyses 
only on scores of negative affectivity (referred to herein as 
negativity).
Statistical analyses
After the removal of four multivariate outliers across tasks, 
Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) was performed on the person-
ality data from the initial sample of 303 individuals to iden-
tify distinct profiles of personality styles. Due to technical 
or performance failures, however, some of these behavioural 
measures were missing or incomplete for 13 participants 
(5 males). Since we were interested in data from individu-
als who performed all measures, Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA) and Structural Equation Modelling 
(SEM) were performed on a final sample of 290 partici-
pants to compare personality profiles across each measure 
of social cognition, and the inter-relationships among them. 
Where measures violated the assumption of normality, non-
parametric analyses were conducted. Values below present 
means (± SE).
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Latent Profile Analysis
Latent Profile Analysis (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968) was 
conducted on PSDI data to classify participants into homo-
geneous sub-groups on the basis of preferred personality 
styles across all personality dimensions. LPA is a data-
driven, model-based analytical technique that uncovers 
hidden groups within a sample of individuals, while taking 
into account uncertainty of group membership for each par-
ticipant. Models with one to five latent profiles were calcu-
lated to identify the best-fitting model. The optimal model 
solution was determined on the basis of several fit indi-
ces, including Akaike Information Criteria (AIC; Akaike, 
1974), Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), 
sample-size adjusted BIC, the Lo-Mendell-Rubin Adjusted 
Likelihood Ratio Test (LMRT; Lo, Mendell, & Rubin, 
2001), the Parametric Bootstrapped Likelihood Ratio Test 
(BLRT; McLachlan & Peel, 2000), and entropy, as well as 
with respect to the previous research. The LMRT and BLRT 
reflect a significant improvement in model fit after compar-
ing a given profile solution with a model that contains one 
less profile. Entropy summarises the degree of accuracy in 
classifying participants into discrete profiles on the basis of 
posterior probabilities, with higher values signifying a better 
profile separation (Ramaswamy, DeSarbo, Reibstein, & Rob-
inson, 1993). While there is no general consensus on which 
fit indices should be preferred in case of their disagreement, 
the past research suggests that some indicators tend to per-
form better than others—BIC and sample-size adjusted BIC, 
for instance, have been shown to be more accurate in identi-
fication of correct solution compared to AIC, which tends to 
overestimate the number of profiles. Furthermore, the BLRT 
has been found to outperform LMRT as well as the rest of 
above-listed indices across various models and sample sizes 
(Nylund, Asparouhov & Muthén, 2007; Morgan, 2015). For 
this reason, we used maximal convergence among all fit indi-
ces to determine the optimal number of profiles.
The analyses were conducted in Mplus 7.3 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2012), with 100 bootstrap samples drawn from all 
the models for BLRT.
Performance measure checks
The stimulus–response compatibility task successfully elic-
ited automatic imitation; participants were faster to respond 
correctly to the imperative stimulus on compatible com-
pared with incompatible trials [480.12 (± 3.71) vs. 487.96 
(3.82) ms;  Z(290) = 3.27, p = 0.001]. Accuracy was equivalent 
between the conditions; however, [94.79 (± 0.33) vs. 94.81 
(± 0.34) ms;  Z(290) = 0.48, p = 0.630].
When measuring VPT, participants were expectedly 
slower and less accurate on the experimental condition 
[4.98 (± 0.07) s, 81.28 (± 1.04) %] compared with control 
conditions one [4.94 (± 0.06) s, Z = 2.29, p = 0.022; 87.93 
(± 0.95) %, Z = 9.57, p < 0.001] and two of the Director 
Task [4.88 (± 0.05) s, Z = 4.52, p < 0.001; 86.53 (± 0.92) %, 
Z = 7.76, p < 0.001].
Structural equation modelling
We conducted SEM to investigate directional relationships 
between our various measures of socio-cognitive and -emo-
tional abilities, and the influence of personality. First, all 
pairwise plots were examined for nonlinearity and hetero-
scedasticity, and the distributions of the dependent vari-
ables were checked for multivariate outliers (c.f. Tabach-
nik & Fidell, 2013) before the variance of each variable 
was examined and modified as per Kline (2015). We then 
defined a default model—a reference against which any 
subsequent modifications suggested by the SEM analysis 
could be evaluated (e.g., addition or removal of directional 
paths and covariances). We employed a two-step process to 
arrive at a default structure objectively: first, we performed 
an MANOVA to identify variables that did and did not differ 
directly between the two personality classes. Having identi-
fied variables that did not differ, we then entered each into a 
mediation analysis to examine whether or not they differed 
between personality profiles indirectly via the influence of 
other measures. This approach follows contemporary rec-
ommendations that argue against the first condition of the 
causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986); specifically, 
the causal and outcome variable do not need to be corre-
lated for the identification of important mediating influences 
(Hayes, 2013; Kenny & Judd, 2014; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 
2010). Only variables that differed significantly between 
the personality profiles and correlated with those that did 
not differ were considered as mediators, however, thereby 
satisfying the second and third conditions of the causal 
steps approach. Mediation analyses were conducted using 
ordinary least-squares path analysis (Hayes, 2013). Indirect 
effects were assessed with 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap 
confidence intervals to ensure that, for significant paths, 
these did not overlap zero.
Having defined a default model by combining all fully 
or partially mediated models, in a step-by-step manner, we 
implemented structural changes suggested by modification 
indices that decreased disparity in fit between the observed 
and modelled data; specifically, changes that resulted in sig-
nificant decreases of χ2, AIC, and the BIC.
Results
All fit indices from the LPA suggested that a two-profile 
solution was optimal (see Supplementary Table S3). Fig-
ure 1 illustrates these two profiles of personality styles, with 
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negative scores, indicating that a style is used infrequently 
and positive scores suggestive of a tendency (persistence) 
for that style. Latent profile 1 (P#1) comprised 187 partici-
pants (61.7%; 78 males), and is characterised by low scores 
on the Self-critical-Avoidant, Spontaneous-Borderline, and 
Passive-Depressive styles. Instead, individuals in this profile 
demonstrate a slight tendency for the Optimistic–Rhapsodic 
and Charming–Histrionic styles. Importantly, however, these 
style preferences are less strong than those shown by profile 
2 (P#2), indicating less rigidity (greater flexibility). The 116 
participants (38.3%; 44 males) comprising P#2 scored low 
on Optimistic–Rhapsodic and Charming–Histrionic person-
ality styles but especially high on the Self-critical–Avoidant, 
Spontaneous–Borderline, and Passive–Depressive styles. 
Such strong scores on these personality styles indicate rela-
tive inflexibility. No significant differences between the pro-
files were found with respect to demographics such as sex, 
age, marital status, or completed education (see Supplemen-
tary Table S1). To check the reliability of the participant 
classification and profile characterisation, we performed two 
split-half validations; the sample was divided randomly into 
halves and a two-profile LPA was performed on each of the 
four sub-samples. Aside from a single instance of misclas-
sification in one sub-sample, profile classifications were 
equivalent across all four iterations, as was the characteri-
sation of the two profiles (see Supplementary Figure S2).
As shown in Table 1, an MANOVA revealed that mean 
scores on seven of our 11 measures of social cognition dif-
fered significantly between the two personality profiles. 
In line with the results of the LPA, individuals showing 
greater flexibility between styles (P#1) scored higher on 
both dimensions of action orientation (AOF and AOD), and 
lower on Personal distress and negativity relative to P#2. 
These individuals also reported higher Perspective taking, 
which showed superior interoceptive accuracy and exhibited 
considerably lower automatic imitation compared with P#2.
Mediation analyses were then conducted on the four 
measures that did not differ significantly between the per-
sonality profiles: Empathic concern, visual perspective 
taking (VPT), emotion regulation, and affective empathy. 
Supplementary Table S4 presents the correlations between 
these four measures and all other dependent variables 
used to define potential mediators. Four models emerged 
that revealed variables serving as significant mediators in 
the influence of personality on measures of social cogni-
tion: (1) interoceptive accuracy fully mediated the effect 
on emotion regulation; (2) negativity and automatic imita-
tion fully mediated the influence on affective empathy; (3) 
self-reported Perspective taking fully mediated the effect on 
VPT; (4) self-reported Personal distress, Perspective taking, 
and AOF partially mediated the influence on self-reported 
Empathic concern. The direction of these mediating influ-
ences is presented below, along with a description of the 
SEM results. It is important to stress that the term “full 
mediation” is a statistical concept—it does not imply that 
only the modelled variables underpin an observed relation-
ship (see Hayes, 2018).
When these separate mediation models were combined in 
an SEM analysis, modification indices suggested only three 
changes: the removal of a direct pathway from personal-
ity profile to VPT and two covariances—between AOF and 
Fig. 1  Profiles emerging from Latent Profile Analysis. Negative 
scores suggest a style is used infrequently, whilst positive scores indi-
cate a strong preference (inflexibility) for that style
Table 1  Direct group comparisons
Values present means (± SE)
AOF Failure-related action orientation, AOD Demand-related action 
orientation, PT Perspective-taking, EC Empathic concern; PD Per-
sonal distress, VPT visual perspective taking, ERFAR emotion regula-
tion, EmpathyAff. affective empathy, INTAcc. interoceptive accuracy, 
IMIAuto. automatic imitation
Measure Profile means F p value ηp2
#1 #2
AOF 6.22 (± 0.20) 3.51 (± 0.26) 70.44 < 0.001 0.20
AOD 6.69 (± 0.20) 4.15 (± 0.30) 62.16 < 0.001 0.18
PT 18.82 (± 0.33) 17.60 (± 0.43) 5.05 0.025 0.02
EC 18.85 (± 0.37) 19.60 (± 0.48) 1.53 0.217 0.01
PD 12.25 (± 0.30) 16.95 (± 0.38) 94.92 < 0.001 0.25
Negativity 2.25 (± 0.03) 2.36 (± 0.04) 5.51 0.020 0.02
VPT − 0.05 
(± 0.07)
0.08 (± 0.10) 1.01 0.316 < 0.01
ERFAR − 0.11 
(± 0.07)
0.05 (± 0.09) 2.10 0.148 < 0.01
EmpathyAff 21.88 (± 0.22) 21.26 (± 0.29) 3.01 0.084 0.01
INTAcc 0.50 (± 0.02) 0.422 (± 0.03) 3.96 0.048 0.01
IMIAuto 3.70 (± 3.00) 14.70 (± 3.87) 5.06 0.025 0.02
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self-reported Perspective taking, and AOF and Personal dis-
tress. The final model is presented in Fig. 2, which achieved 
excellent levels of fit with the observed data across discrep-
ancy functions (χ2[37] = 37.32, p = 0.45; root-mean-square 
error of approximation = 0.008) and comparative indices 
(normalised fit index = 0.896; comparative fit index = 0.999; 
Tucker Lewis index = 0.998). Moving clockwise through this 
structure from top left, the first branch presents an indirect 
pathway through which interoceptive accuracy fully medi-
ates the influence of personality on emotion regulation. The 
ab path (indirect effect) reveals how the two personality 
profiles are estimated to differ on emotion regulation (the 
outcome) as a result of the effect of personality on interocep-
tive accuracy (the mediator), which, in turn, affects emotion 
regulation (the b path; cf. Hayes, 2013, pp. 92). In other 
words, while emotion regulation did not significantly differ 
directly between the two profiles, P#2 did have significantly 
poorer interoceptive accuracy and, through the positive 
relationship between interoception and emotion regulation, 
this was associated with a better emotion regulation (lower 
false-alarm rate).
The second branch encompasses a multimediator model, 
whereby there is no direct effect of personality on affec-
tive empathy but two indirect effects involving negativity 
and automatic imitation. First, individuals in P#2 exhibit 
stronger negativity than those in P#1, and this is associ-
ated inversely with affective empathy. As such, those in P#2 
express a more negative affective state and, consequently, 
are less aroused by the emotions of others. P#2 also exhibit 
stronger automatic imitation relative to P#1, and automatic 
imitation is related positively with affective empathy. Due 
to the positive influence of automatic imitation on affective 
Fig. 2  Unstandardised parameter estimates emerging from structural 
equation modelling (Hayes, 2013), expressing the values of profile 2 
(P#2) relative to profile 1 (P#1). Grey nodes represent measures that 
did not differ significantly between personality profiles, while white 
nodes represent indirect pathways identified by mediation analy-
ses. Dashed lines show changes to the mediation models suggested 
by modification indices: the curved lines represent covariances, and 
the straight line signifies a direct connection that was removed from 
the default model. ERFAR emotion regulation, EmpathyAff. affective 
empathy, INTAcc. interoceptive accuracy, IMIAuto automatic imitation, 
PD Personal distress, PT Perspective-taking, EC Empathic concern, 
AOF Failure-related action orientation, VPT visual perspective tak-
ing; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Psychological Research 
1 3
empathy, when taking into account the difference between 
profiles, people in P#2 show higher affective empathy than 
those in P#1. This inconsistent mediation reveals the oppos-
ing influences of negative affectivity and imitative tenden-
cies on affective empathy, which has the potential to mask 
any difference between personality profiles.
The bottom right-hand branch comprises a single indirect 
pathway; those in P#2 report lower self-reported Perspective 
taking, and this is associated inversely with VPT. Keeping 
in mind that higher scores on VPT reflect poorer perfor-
mance (inverted efficiency), the indirect path reveals that 
P#2 perform worse on the Director Task as a result of their 
self-reported lower Perspective taking.
The final branch presents another multimediator model, 
but this time comprising sub-scales from the self-report 
instruments. Relative to P#1, P#2 express lower Perspec-
tive taking, and through the positive relationship between 
Perspective taking and Empathic concern, in turn, demon-
strate lower Empathic concern. Conversely, P#2 also exhibit 
higher Personal distress and, in turn, this is positively related 
to Empathic concern compared with P#1. Finally, people 
categorised as P#2 report lower AOF, with this associated 
negatively with scores of Empathic concern. Due to the neg-
ative influence of AOF on Empathic concern, P#2 express 
increased Empathic concern relative to P#1.
Discussion
This study sought to elucidate the structure of inter-relation-
ships and co-dependencies among discrete components of 
social cognition, and the personality mechanisms driving 
individual differences in this structure. From a large non-
clinical sample, we acquired both performance-based and 
self-report measures of various socio-cognitive and -emo-
tional capacities, and personality data with an instrument 
capable of delineating between personality style configura-
tions. After profiling participants according to their person-
ality style tendencies, we compared them on discrete facets 
of social cognition. Our results revealed three primary find-
ings: (1) two dissociable personality profiles emerged that 
exhibited contrasting cognitive and affective dispositions; 
one showing flexibility among personality styles and adap-
tive action orientation, the other expressing persistence for 
certain styles and state orientation; (2) these profiles dif-
fered on a number of performance and self-report measures, 
revealing that mechanisms driving individual differences in 
personality also shape social cognition; (3) other facets of 
social cognition appear to mediate differences between these 
profiles in selected components, uncovering a hierarchical 
structure.
The two emerging profiles differed primarily in 
their preference for styles of Self-critical–Avoidant, 
Passive–Depressive, Spontaneous–Borderline, Optimis-
tic–Rhapsodic, and Charming–Histrionic. According to the 
PSI theory, the lack of a strong preference across personality 
styles in Profile 1 (P#1) is indicative of greater flexibility 
and adaptation; individuals employing a larger repertoire 
of styles should be able to adjust to different situational 
demands more efficiently (Block, 2002; Kuhl, 2000a). In 
contrast, the strong tendency for Self-critical–Avoidant and 
Passive–Depressive styles shown by individuals in Profile 2 
(P#2) suggests more inflexibility or rigidity. The styles pre-
ferred by P#2 indicate that they have a heightened sensitivity 
for negative affect together with a tendency to down-regu-
late positive affect. Interestingly, this replicates two previ-
ous findings: our group has identified a similar profile in an 
independent sample (n = 431; Czekóová, Shaw, & Urbánek, 
2016), and a large-scale review of personality styles reports 
an “Overcontrolled prototype” that exhibits many of the 
same characteristics (Donnellan & Robbins, 2010). In line 
with these contrasting personality characteristics, individu-
als in P#2 expressed significantly stronger negativity than 
those in P#1. The PSI framework predicts that (a) chronic 
down-regulation of positive affect may induce state orienta-
tion, and (b) state-oriented individuals discriminate poorly 
between their own and others’ thoughts, wishes, and expec-
tations (Koole et al., 2006; Kuhl, 1992). Consistent with 
the former premise, P#2 scored significantly lower on both 
Failure- and Demand-related action orientation (AOF and 
AOD, respectively), indicating a poorer ability to regulate 
their emotions when faced with negative events. This profile 
also scored lower on self-reported Perspective taking during 
social interactions, reported higher Personal distress when 
empathising with others, and exhibited much stronger imita-
tive tendencies—all indices of inefficient self-other distinc-
tion (SOD).
The characteristics of these two personality profiles 
appear to resemble divergent patterns of cognitive control 
(e.g., Hommel & Colzato, 2017)—a fundamental capacity 
to override, restrain, or inhibit unwanted yet dominant action 
tendencies. It is proposed that individuals with high cogni-
tive control can adapt more flexibly to highly demanding 
situations (action orientation) compared with individuals 
exhibiting inefficient cognitive control, who are less capa-
ble of activating appropriate adjustment processes (state 
orientation; Jostman & Koole, 2007). Consistent with this, 
prior research has shown that those with efficient cognitive 
control have a better emotion regulation and lower negative 
affect (Inzlicht et al., 2015). In this light, it could be argued 
that individuals in P#1 (higher flexibility) have, in general, 
a better cognitive control than those in P#2, enabling them 
to regulate their emotions more effectively and switch flex-
ibly between cognitive self- and other-action/-affect repre-
sentations. This would result in efficient SOD, leading to 
the reduced Personal distress when empathising and better 
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control over imitative tendencies shown by P#1. In contrast, 
poorer cognitive control will lead to a cognitive system that 
is too inflexible to switch between alternative cognitive rep-
resentations. Further research is needed to ascertain whether 
cognitive control does, indeed, underlie the two divergent 
personality profiles which we have observed. Furthermore, 
since considerable progress has been made in elucidating 
the various factors contributing to cognitive control (e.g., 
genetic and neurophysiological mechanisms; see Hommel, 
2015), future research should investigate whether these same 
factors drive these two differential personality profiles.
Participants in P#2 reported significantly lower Perspec-
tive taking, and this was negatively associated with their 
VPT performance—with a lower tendency to take the per-
spective of others during social interaction, individuals 
are worse when resolving conflicts between their own and 
another’s perspective. This is, perhaps, unsurprising given 
the inefficient SOD of P#2, as indexed by their increased 
automatic imitation (Brass et al., 2009) and Personal dis-
tress (Lamm et al., 2016), and their apparent inefficiency 
in meta-control; avoiding ego-centric errors in perspective 
taking demands an ability to distinguish flexibly between 
competing self and other representations (Keysar et al., 
2000; for a critical discussion, see Heyes, 2014; Santieste-
ban et al., 2012a). The state orientation of these individuals 
also suggests a bias in attentional focus towards the self, an 
additional factor shown to impact negatively on the ability 
to adopt another person’s viewpoint (Bukowski & Samson, 
2016). Interestingly, individuals in P#2 showed a strong 
preference for Self-critical-Avoidant personality style, and 
patients diagnosed with Avoidant personality disorder pre-
sent difficulties with metacognitive abilities of monitoring 
and decentration—the mislabelling of self-states and poor 
inference of others’ states, respectively (Moroni et al., 2016). 
This will result in both low ability and motivation to take 
the perspective of others, thereby reinforcing social with-
drawal and hindering practice in perspective taking (for a 
related discussion, see Bird & Viding, 2014). In line with 
this, an association was reported recently between higher 
social anxiety and lower VPT (Pile et al., 2017). Studies 
have also shown that training individuals to withhold invol-
untary imitation enhances perspective-taking performance 
(Santiesteban et al., 2012b). It would be interesting, then, to 
see how individuals comprising P#2 respond to such SOD 
training; if effective, this simple intervention might prove 
beneficial for samples characterised by ego-centrism (Pile 
et al., 2017).
Given the significant difference in self-reported action 
orientation between profiles, it is surprising that personality 
did not influence emotion regulation directly; differences in 
false-alarm rate for affective stimuli on the emotional Go/
No-Go task emerged only after interoceptive accuracy was 
included in the model. Moreover, the positive association 
between interoceptive accuracy and emotion regulation 
seems counter-intuitive; why should the greater interocep-
tive accuracy shown by individuals in P#1 lead to poorer 
emotion regulation? We suggest that this indicates a complex 
interaction between affective dispositions and the processing 
of physiological signals. While action-orientated individuals 
are more decisive and show less rumination under stress, 
when combined with enhanced processing of emotional 
stimuli facilitated by heightened interoception (see Critch-
ley & Garfinkel, 2017), this might manifest as impulsivity 
on the emotional Go/No-Go task—that is, it may interfere 
with the withholding of responses to emotional expressions 
in others. At this point, it is important to stress that action 
orientation per se should not be considered superior to state 
orientation; individuals will benefit from a state-orientated 
approach in certain social situations, such as dangerous and 
unpredictable contexts (see Kuhl, 1992). Rather, effective 
emotion regulation requires the ability to switch flexibly 
between regulatory strategies in different situations. Like-
wise, it has been proposed that a balance between flexibil-
ity and persistence is needed for optimal cognitive control 
(Hommel, 2015).
Converging with the findings of Ainley et al. (2015), no 
association was observed between interoceptive accuracy 
and affective empathy, whether the latter is measured via 
the ratings of arousal in response to the emotions of oth-
ers or by self-report instrument. Instead, our data reveal 
two mechanisms that together mediate the influence of 
personality mechanisms on empathic expression in oppos-
ing directions: First, negativity is related inversely with 
affective empathy, and through this pathway, individuals 
in P#2 exhibiting stronger negativity than P#1 also show 
less affective empathy. Negative affectivity has been shown 
to be associated positively with Personal distress (Eisen-
berg et al., 1994), and our data show that P#2 exhibited 
both stronger negativity and greater Personal distress than 
P#1. As such, this mediating effect of negativity might 
drive individuals in P#2 to withdraw, either implicitly or 
explicitly, from empathic engagement. Second, the strength 
of involuntary imitative tendencies is associated positively 
with affective empathy, and so greater imitative tendencies 
shown by P#2 may lead them to experience more arousal 
when empathising. Involuntary imitation is attributed to 
neural perception–action matching mechanisms (see Heyes, 
2011); observing an action activates corresponding cortical 
motor representations, which serves to prime its execution. 
Through this mirroring process, we can simulate others’ 
actions implicitly (e.g., Gallese, 2013). In the same way, 
these mirroring mechanisms might permit the simulation of 
other emotions during empathy; the experience, observation, 
and imagination of an emotion engages overlapping brain 
responses (Jabbi, Bastiaansen, & Keysers, 2008; Wicker 
et al., 2003). Taking this into consideration, our data suggest 
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that the ability to empathize affectively with others depends 
upon an interaction between our own current affective state 
and our tendency to simulate the emotional state of others. 
The difference which we observed in imitative tendencies 
between personality profiles stands in contrast to the find-
ings of Butler et al. (2015) who observed no such influence 
of stable personality traits. This discrepancy could be due to 
methodological factors: first, imitation elicited by the action 
stimuli employed by Butler et al. (2015) is influenced heavily 
by spatial confounds (see Bertenthal et al., 2006; Shaw et al., 
2017), but the present study used stimuli that avoided these 
effects and might have unmasked this relationship. Second, 
our person-centred approach to personality assessment 
might be more sensitive than the variable-centred approach 
adopted by Butler et al. (2015) in uncovering associations 
between this aspect of behaviour and personality.
The majority of sub-scales measured by the self-report 
instruments were clustered together in a single multimedia-
tor model. Lower Perspective taking, higher Personal dis-
tress, and reduced AOF reported by P#2 served as mediators 
in the influence of personality on Empathic concern. First, 
P#2 report higher Personal distress relative to P#1 and, in 
turn, this is associated positively with Empathic concern. 
Since the Empathic concern sub-scale is considered an 
explicit measure of affective empathy, this is entirely con-
sistent with this group’s increased affective empathy. This 
may be indicative of greater self-other merging. Indeed, 
these same individuals exhibit greater automatic imitation, 
which suggests lower SOD. As discussed above, imitative 
tendencies are believed to reflect neural mirroring mecha-
nisms through which the actions and emotions of others are 
understood through a process of implicit simulation. Inef-
ficient distinction between self- and other-affect representa-
tions will lead to a misattribution of increased arousal levels 
experienced during this simulation process, leading to Per-
sonal distress when empathising (Lamm et al., 2016).
Conversely, P#2 report lower Perspective taking and AOF 
compared with P#1, and these two sub-scales are related to 
Empathic concern in an opposing manner; while reduced 
Perspective taking is associated with lower Empathic con-
cern, decreased AOF is related to greater Empathic concern. 
Focusing on the first of these indirect pathways, the ego-cen-
tric attentional focus of this group seems to reduce the con-
cern that they feel for others when empathising. The second 
pathway might be explained by the other inter-relationships 
and co-dependencies revealed in our structural model; P#2 
report more state orientation during negative experiences 
and a greater tendency to imitate others, the latter of which 
leads to greater arousal during empathy. In the same way 
that imitation of others’ emotional states will lead to per-
sonal distress without compensatory SOD mechanisms, the 
state-orientated style of emotion regulation characterising 
this profile seems to result in greater empathic concern for 
the agent whose affect that they are simulating.
It is noteworthy that, aside from Perspective taking, none 
of the other sub-scales from self-report instruments served 
to mediate differences between personality profiles on the 
corresponding performance measures. This lack of associa-
tion between explicit and implicit measures (see also Ain-
ley et al., 2015; Böckler, Tusche, & Singer, 2016; Melchers 
et al., 2016) may suggest that they capture different facets 
of social cognition, or that our subjective experiences dif-
fer from our actual abilities. Our results indicate that many 
of the explicit measures are inter-related, and covariance 
between self-report measures suggest that individuals’ sub-
jective view of themselves is consistent. As such, further 
research is needed to investigate whether self-report meas-
ures of social cognition differ from actual ability, and how 
personality might influence this.
Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the first investigation into social 
cognition that has collected data from a large sample on 
such an extensive battery of self-report and performance-
based measures, and considered the influence of personal-
ity on patterns of inter-relationships and mediating effects 
among them. Our results reveal a hierarchical pattern of rela-
tionships among various components of social cognition, 
informing us about manner in which lower level cognitive 
mechanisms (e.g., visual perspective taking and self-other 
distinction) may influence higher level socio-emotional pro-
cesses (e.g., affective empathy and emotion regulation). By 
moving beyond the modular approach that has dominated 
social cognition research to date, such findings provide a 
more detailed characterisation of individual differences in 
social behaviour. Using a person-centred approach to per-
sonality assessment, we have also shown that different con-
figurations of personality systems exert an influence over 
discrete aspects of social cognition. At the most general 
level, these two profiles appear to reflect opposing capacities 
for cognitive control–flexibility versus rigidity/persistence—
thereby providing a model for future research.
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